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Abstract 
Drawing together insights from neo-Innisian geography and environmental history, this paper 
explores the landscape and environmental changes engendered by ‘cyclonic’ patterns of 
development associated with uranium production at Uranium City, Saskatchewan. Strong 
postwar demand for uranium led to the establishment and rapid expansion of Uranium City on 
the north shore of Lake Athabasca as a ‘yellowcake town,’ dedicated to producing uranium 
oxide concentrate to supply federal government contracts with the United States military. In spite 
of optimistic assessments for the region’s industrial future, the new settlement remained 
inherently unstable, tied to shifting institutional arrangements and external markets, and 
haunted by the spectre of resource depletion. The planning and development of the townsite at 
Uranium City reflected both neo-colonial desires to open the north to Euro-Canadian settlement 
and efforts by the state to buffer the stormy effects of resource dependency. Ultimately, however, 
quixotic government efforts to implant an outpost of industrial modernity in the Athabasca 
Region failed to forestall the inevitable winds of change, which left in their wake destructive 
legacies of social dislocation and environmental degradation, already evident with the near-
collapse of the uranium export market by the early 1960s. 
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 A cyclone hit the northern shore of Lake Athabasca in 1944—neither a climatological 
event nor force of nature, it was instead a whirlwind of industrial development lasting, in its first 
phase, some 15 years or so. Centred on the exploitation of extensive low-grade uranium deposits, 
this paroxysm of development radically remade the region’s physical and human landscapes, 
overturning traditional land uses and social arrangements, and erecting entirely new forms in 
their place. The boom began with a rush for uranium in northern Saskatchewan that attracted 
thousands of prospectors, mining capital, and state interests to this remote region. This led to the 
establishment and rapid expansion of Uranium City as a ‘yellowcake town’ dedicated to 
producing uranium oxide concentrate to supply government contracts with the United States 
military. This, in turn, stirred hopes that Uranium City would become a springboard to the 
industrialization of Saskatchewan’s northern hinterland. 
 Yet the new landscapes created by the cyclonic forces of staple development were 
inherently unstable, buffeted by changes in technology, tied to shifting institutional arrangements 
and external markets, and—ultimately—haunted by the spectre of resource depletion. By the 
early 1960s, the region was already in decline, due to the near collapse of the international 
uranium market. After two more decades of boom and bust cycles, the town of Uranium City 
was virtually abandoned. While the proximate causes of this decline were ore depletion, low 
commodity prices and changing labour arrangements in the northern mining sector, this paper 
contends that a deeper account of the rise and fall of Uranium City lies in its connection to the 
historical geography of resource-extractive economies in modern Canada and the quixotic 
attempts to control the human and environmental effects of what Harold Innis aptly described as 
‘cyclonic’ patterns of development. In examining the early history of Uranium City, this paper 
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ties together several strands of inquiry associated with Innisian political economy: natural 
resource extractive economies and the geographical relations they spawn; colonialism and 
national development; and the role of the state in shaping these patterns and processes. The case 
of Uranium City illustrates how the cyclonic nature of a particular staples development, and 
efforts to control or at least mitigate these stormy effects, were registered in the physical 
landscapes and environmental legacies of this resource extractive region. 
 
Cyclonic landscapes 
In his writing on global mineral rushes, the economic geographer and historian Harold Innis 
deployed the metaphor of a cyclone to describe the intensity of economic and cultural changes 
resulting from the incursion of metropolitan industrial capital and technologies into remote, 
resource-rich regions (Innis 1943; Drache 1995, xvii; Watson 2006, 160). Innis described the 
economies of staples-dependent frontier countries as ‘storm centres to the modern international 
economy,’ subject to violent disturbances in market and institutional conditions (Innis 1946, 33). 
As further developed by Trevor Barnes (2005, 112), ‘cyclonics’ indicates the ‘whirlwind ferocity 
of capitalist accumulation at resource sites, and the equally ferocious decline that follows.’ Such 
instability renders settlement and economy on the periphery of the capitalist system inherently 
precarious, subject to the disruptive shocks of geographically distant technological changes, 
market cycles, and government policies. Barnes extends these insights further, arguing that 
different staples exhibit particular ‘space-time biases’ rooted in the geographical and historical 
processes through which they are discovered, produced, and incorporated into cycles of capitalist 
accumulation (Barnes 2005; Barnes et. al. 2001). As Jody Berland (1999) suggests, the 
production of space under the cyclonic conditions of staples development results not simply in 
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disorder, but rather the creation of a new spatial order, however temporarily, at these marginal 
sites.  
 The cyclone metaphor not only attempts to capture these economic fluctuations and their 
spatial consequences, but (from a mining perspective) also helps avoid the naturalization of 
economic booms and busts inherent in the notion of a ‘resource cycle’ (Clapp 1998) or 
Aschmann’s (1970) classic theory of a mine’s ‘natural history.’ Instead, it points to the 
importance of considering how ‘politics and institutions thoroughly constitute as well as 
condition the resource cycle’ (Reed and Prudham 2001, 13; Norcliffe 1999). In particular, 
cyclonics emphasizes the effects of the dynamic initial phase of commodity development, with 
its rapid influx of labour, technology, and communications (including transportation) into 
resource regions, and the equally disturbing periods of transformation and/or decline that 
accompany subsequent shifts in commodity production, demands or prices, institutional 
arrangements (such as government regulations) or, less frequently, outright resource exhaustion. 
As Innis (1946) argued, the disturbances characteristic of frontier regions have created 
challenges for governments, which struggled both to foster resource-based economies and to 
stabilize them in the face of their economic volatility. It is the contention of this paper that Innis’ 
metaphor—less a theory of development than what Barnes (1996, Chapter 8) refers to as a ‘local 
model’ of historical-geographical patterns—may be extended beyond political economy to help 
explain the dramatic transformations of landscape, environment, and social relations on Canada’s 
northern mining frontier. 
 At the same time, it is important to recognize the limits of this metaphor and to 
emphasize—as rural sociologists increasingly suggest we must—the ‘historical specificity’ in 
‘the ways in which the relationships between resource extraction and regional development have 
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changed over time’ (Frickel and Freudenburg 1996, 448; Freudenburg 1992; Wilson 2004). 
Indeed, Barnes et. al. argue that ‘Innis's model of the cyclone is devised to highlight the 
specificity of a particular kind of commodity production in a particular place’ (2001, 2131); their 
study of Port Alberni, B.C., demonstrates how the specific institutional and market conditions of 
the forest industry shaped the historical trajectory and economic fate of the town. Thus, the 
instability characteristic of settlements at the resource periphery reflects cyclonic processes 
related to individual staples: ‘Single industry towns ... are borderline communities connected to 
the spatial and temporal relations produced by the staples on which they depend’ (Barnes 2005, 
110). Similarly, as students of the Innis-inspired ‘new political economy’ school have argued, 
mineral industries in Canada and elsewhere are marked by geographical patterns of uneven 
development under which resource peripheries remain in a state of social and economic 
underdevelopment while benefits flow to metropolitan regions (Drache 1995; Clement 1997; 
Watkins et. al. 2006). These patterns produce uncertainty and unpredictability in the ‘extractive 
spaces’ (Bridge 2001; Brechin 1999) of mining regions, which often remain dependent upon the 
exploitation of a single resource for export markets: ‘In addition, cyclical patterns (boom and 
bust cycles) in the economy… affect the stability of levels of production and levels of 
employment, not only in single enterprise towns but in the whole of the resource extractive 
sector’ (Bradbury 1979, 149; Bradbury 1984a). Notwithstanding recent calls to recognize the 
diversity amongst resource-dependent communities in Canada (Randall and Ironside 1996), it is 
clear that mining communities, in particular, struggle with the destabilizing effects of commodity 
market fluctuations and resource exhaustion. 
 Yet political economy alone does not entirely constitute the stormy geography of mining 
regions. Acknowledging the ‘nature’ of staples (as Innis so famously does in the first chapters of 
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his work on the cod fisheries and the fur trade) points to a second corollary of cyclonics, only 
hinted at in Barnes’ work: that staples are not only commodities embedded within the 
geographies of technology, markets, and institutions, but are also natural resources, each with its 
own biophysical, ecological or geological limits, processes, and characteristics (Bakker and 
Bridge 2006; Wilson 2004). Thus resource development, as viewed from the extractive margin 
(as Barnes et. al. [2001] suggest we see it), is at once shaped by and reshapes local landscapes 
and environments. This perspective brings into focus a set of historical and geographical 
questions that typically preoccupy environmental historians. Even without explicit references to 
Innis or staples, environmental historians illustrate how the reliance of communities on a 
renewable resource such as forestry or a fugitive resource such as the fishery produces particular 
kinds of historical-geographical patterns (perhaps, ‘space-time biases’) that must be 
disaggregated from the broad general category of staples (or commodities) in order to understand 
the history and fates of these communities. For mining, the classic example is William Cronon’s 
account of Kennecott, Alaska, which traces the ‘paths out of town’ that connected this remote 
mining region to networks of capital and technology, resulting in the transformation of its natural 
(and human) environment. At Kennecott, ‘a particular vein of a particular mineral created an 
opportunity, and a particular culture with particular social and technical needs then seized that 
opportunity for its own purposes’ (Cronon 1992, 49). Recent works by Thomas Andrews (2008) 
and Kathleen Brosnan (2002) on Colorado, Kathryn Morse (2003) on the Klondike, and Andrew 
Isenberg (2005) on California similarly highlight how mineral production brings into existence a 
variety of communities whose dependence on the products of the earth placed them in a uniquely 
intimate, if at times obscured, relationship with the natural world. 
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 This paper draws together these insights into resource regions to explore the landscape 
changes engendered by uranium production at Uranium City, and suggests a series of important 
avenues for their interpretation under the umbrella of cyclonic development. As a high-value and 
strategic mineral, uranium provided a powerful motive force for what Liza Piper (2009) refers to 
as the ‘industrial assimilation’ of Canada’s sub-Arctic environment by capital and the state in the 
decades around the Second World War. Through new technologies, markets, and institutional 
arrangements, uranium was extracted, refined, and shipped south from what a generation earlier 
had been almost impossibly remote northern locations. The new settlement of Uranium City 
became a focal point for these far-flung arrangements after the war. Here, the ‘space-time weave’ 
achieved by uranium development stitched together: distant markets; extensive transportation 
networks and processing facilities; the extensive and voracious resource demands of an industrial 
mining operation; regional, national, and international political economies; and regional 
populations, ecologies, and landscapes. Through the 1950s, cyclonic processes rapidly brought 
together these many actors and conditions, and then almost as rapidly rent them asunder. It is this 
early period of intense resource development and the equally sudden destabilization of the 
arrangements surrounding it that form the main period of study in this analysis, though preceding 
and subsequent periods are also considered. 
 Uranium City’s troubled career as a staples-producing community not only reflects the 
geographical political economy of uranium, but also reveals the historical-geographical impetus 
of a Canadian colonial modernity. For many contemporaries, uranium represented Canada’s 
entry and participation in the atomic age, the ultra-modern world of industrialism and mass 
consumption. The uranium industry was tightly regulated and dominated by a federal Crown 
corporation, Eldorado Mining and Refining, and both the federal and provincial state attempted 
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to buffer the disorderly effects of resource development through rational planning and the close 
management of people and space at Uranium City. The leadership role of the state in this 
enterprise exemplified (for some) the newfound confidence of Canadians in government as a 
provider or guarantor of services. This modernizing vision coincided with the nationwide desire 
to open up the north to industry and Euro-Canadian settlement. Barnes  et. al. (2001, 2134) 
highlight the colonial context of staples production, noting that the peripheral location of 
resource towns underscores their role as ‘a crystallization point for both a set of external forces 
of colonization and a set of internal forces of internal institutional formation.’ As a catalyst for 
northern colonization, uranium development in Canada provided an expansive state with an 
opportunity to realize its goals of the assimilation of northern resources and Aboriginal  
communities into the broader political economy. Yet this enterprise, and the material effects that 
accompanied it, remained rooted in the notions of land and nature that regarded northern 
territories as empty and/or unused, and built upon unequal legal geographies of colonialism that 
eroded Native sovereignty and access to resources (Borrows 1997; Willems-Braun 1997; Sluyter 
2002; Desbiens 2004). 
 Along with the dynamics of the staples economy, these cultural and ideological 
dimensions played a significant role in constituting and reworking the physical and social 
landscapes of Uranium City and district. Town planning and development regulation at Uranium 
City reflected contemporary efforts by the state to stabilize resource communities and their 
largely imported workforces by creating settlements that mirrored southern Canadian values and 
landscapes. These landscapes, and the economies they supported, actively marginalized 
Aboriginal  people, who remained physically and occupationally segregated in the new industrial 
economy, yet suffered the consequences of the environmental changes and economic 
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dependencies associated with cyclonic development. Ultimately, government efforts to implant 
an outpost of industrial modernity in the Athabasca Region failed to forestall the inevitable 
winds of change, which left in their wake destructive legacies of social dislocation and 
environmental damage. 
 
Sowing the wind: The uranium industry and Canada’s north 
 The rapid development and expansion of the uranium industry in Canada in the decades 
around the Second World War reflected both the advent of uranium’s use in atomic weapons as 
well as renewed efforts to tap the mineral wealth of the nation’s vast northern territories. As 
Shelagh Grant (1989) has shown, Canadian wartime planners and bureaucrats promoted the idea 
of a ‘New North’: a barren environment transformed through modern technologies into a 
productive, modern landscape. Minerals were regarded by many contemporaries as a catalyst for 
Euro-Canadian settlement and national expansion (Laytha 1939; Townsley 1935; McAllister 
2007). These nationalist desires intersected with the international geographies of the atomic age 
to draw the remote sub-Arctic region of Canada (and its inhabitants) into dramatically new and 
often disruptive relations with industrial society, state power, and global geopolitics. The 
founding of Uranium City at the outset of the Cold War placed this distant corner of Northern 
Saskatchewan at the forefront of Canadian participation in the nuclear arms race. Its status as an 
ultra-modern industrial settlement also marked it as the harbinger of a new era of economic and 
social progress in Canada’s north.  
 Canadian entanglement in these nuclear geographies dates from the discovery and 
development of radium and uranium in the Northwest Territories beginning in the 1930s. On 
prospecting trips to Great Bear Lake in 1929 and 1930, Ontario-based ‘mine-maker’ Gilbert 
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Labine located significant deposits of silver and pitchblende, a radium- and uranium-bearing 
mineral. Labine’s company, Eldorado Gold Mines Ltd., subsequently established a mine and 
concentrating mill for the production (initially) of high-value radium (Garbutt 1964; Bothwell 
1984). The company established a townsite, Port Radium, at the mine, to which mine workers 
and supplies were flown from southern Canada. Along with the discovery of oil at Norman Wells 
in 1920 (which supplied the Port Radium mine) and the gold strike at Yellowknife on Great 
Slave Lake in 1935, industrial resource extraction brought waves of prospectors and miners to 
the north, and stimulated the expansion of transportation and communications connections 
linking the region with southern capital and state interests (Coates 1985; Zaslow 1988; Rea 
1968). Many southern Canadians welcomed the decisive transformation of this ‘vast, empty, 
cold, country’ (Kupsch 1985) away from the fur trade and towards industrial activities, 
especially mining. 
  The Second World War heralded the dramatic extension of southern technology, 
industry, and state and military activities across the region. A central (though initially secret) 
aspect of this advance was the reopening of the mine at Port Radium (closed shortly after the 
beginning of the war) in 1942 to produce uranium ores for the Allied atomic bomb project. As 
the awesome powers unleashed by nuclear fission became understood, the need to control the 
global uranium supply became evident. A key source of uranium, the Port Radium mine’s 
production became the focus of intense diplomatic wrangling between Britain, Canada and the 
United States (Bothwell 1984). As the American atomic bomb project forged ahead, Canadian 
production became a critical addition to that country’s uranium stockpile. In 1944, the federal 
government nationalized Eldoradoi to ensure the smooth production and delivery of uranium 
oxide (U3O8) concentrates for Allied nuclear weapons laboratories. Although it is unclear 
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whether Canadian-sourced material was used in the atomic weapons dropped on Japan in August 
1945, Canada’s co-operation in uranium supply, processing, and research for the Manhattan 
Project was a key and widely celebrated contribution (Eggleston 1965). 
 The subsequent rise of the uranium industry in Northern Saskatchewan was nothing if not 
‘cyclonic.’ In 1944, prospectors working for Eldorado (which maintained exclusive control over 
exploration, mining, milling and export of uranium) staked claims to pitchblende deposits on the 
north shore of Lake Athabasca near Fish Hook Bay (Kupsch 1978). Stimulated by the enormous 
demand for uranium of the United States Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC), exploration and 
staking continued after the war, culminating in a huge prospecting rush in the late 1940s after the 
relaxation of government controls over the exploration and mining phases of uranium 
production. Armed with Geiger counters, aided by government subsidies, and lured by promises 
of a guaranteed price for uranium, prospectors flooded the Athabasca region; between 1948 and 
1953, some 20,000 claims were staked across Northern Saskatchewan (Brazier 1977, 6), and by 
1954, an estimated 150 mining companies were active in the Beaverlodge District 
(Saskatchewan, Department of Natural Resources, No date b).  In 1951, Eldorado announced it 
would construct a mill to process uranium ore from the area, stimulating a further rush into the 
region. Another large uranium strike 20 miles to the southwest at Crackingstone Point led to the 
construction of mines and mills at Gunnar (1955) and Lorado (1957), which seemed to cement 
the future of the region as a major mining district (Figure 1). [INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT 
HERE] 
 The region’s prosperity relied upon the unique market for refined uranium oxide, driven 
by American military demands. As Eldorado President W.J. Bennett warned the annual 
conference of prospectors and developers in 1951, uranium’s future remained closely tied to this 
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buyer, since Canadian domestic demand was minimal, nor were there prospects of a market for 
industrial power in the immediate future (Bennett 1951a). As Bothwell (1984, Chapter 7) 
recounts, the achievement of a ‘just price’ and guaranteed contracts for uranium was intended to 
promote stability in the industry by removing the normal price fluctuations that beset other 
mineral developments. Prices negotiated between Canadian and USAEC officials in the late 
1940s (and extended in the 1950s) included a formula to account for exploration, transportation, 
and refining costs, all of which were considerable, and aimed to stimulate further exploration and 
development (Bothwell 1984, 324) . Uranium oxide precipitate, a yellow powder referred to as 
‘yellowcake,’ was shipped through an extensive air, land, and water transportation network from 
Eldorado’s mills (and later others) to the Eldorado-run refinery at Port Hope, Ont., for final 
processing before delivery to the USAEC (Bothwell 1984, Chapter 10). Thus, the uranium 
economy relied on a geographically dispersed yet fragile network of state actors and institutional 
arrangements, private and public capital, transportation networks, and physical infrastructure 
aimed to ensure the material flow of uranium from its hinterland geological matrix in Northern 
Saskatchewan to its ultimate destination in U.S. nuclear weapons stockpiles. 
Despite these seemingly precarious arrangements, considerable optimism attended the 
uranium boom in Saskatchewan, as it had in the Northwest Territories. Echoing Canadian 
nationalist sentiments around mineral development in the NWT, the province’s new Co-
operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) government welcomed uranium developments as 
the cornerstone of its own policy to create a ‘New North’ in the extensive sub-Arctic region 
north of the fertile belt and parklands (Saskatchewan 1948). As Premier Tommy Douglas 
declared in 1948, ‘The next four or five years will see tremendous development in northern 
Saskatchewan. … Standing as we do on the threshold of the atomic age, uranium is of 
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tremendous importance to our industrial development’ (cited in Barron 1997, 142-43). 
Apparently willing to overlook uranium’s final destination in American nuclear weapons, the 
socialist CCF embraced the largely state-controlled uranium industry as part of its own program 
to ‘diversify the provincial economy, tap northern resource riches to help fund the coming prairie 
utopia, and bring justice to northern residents’ (Quiring 2004, 13). Nevertheless, the CCF also 
viewed the mining industry with suspicion, and sought a larger role for government in fostering 
and regulating industrial developments. ‘No longer are [the people of Saskatchewan] prepared to 
allow speculators and industrialists to harmfully, and for their own selfish pecuniary interests, to 
[sic] exploit the renewable and non-renewable resource wealth of Saskatchewan,’ wrote one 
bureaucrat in a report on uranium development (Berezowsky 1951). Rather, the Beaverlodge 
discoveries would provide the springboard to industrial modernity in Saskatchewan through the 
co-ordinated exploitation of northern natural riches. 
  
Cyclonic environments 
 As with all mines, uranium development in the Beaverlodge District entailed a variety of 
well-known physical landscape transformations, from the puncture of the earth’s surface via 
shafts and adits, to large-scale surface stripping and excavation of open pits (at Gunnar). Less 
well-appreciated is mining’s transformation of underground environments and the intricate 
technical knowledge it involved, well-described by Liza Piper. The delineation and working of 
underground ore deposits, she argues, brought prospectors, geologists, and miners into intimate 
relations with underground landscapes and geological processes, and were critical in determining 
the viability of mining operations (Piper 2007). Both mining and milling also produced extensive 
wastes, in the form of either stripped ‘overburden’ or surface soils, non-mineral bearing ‘waste’ 
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rock, and the remainder after ore processing, known as tailings, all of which required disposal 
and/or containment (Francaviglia 1991; Goin and Raymond 2004). Due to the low average grade 
of the ore, uranium production generated millions of tons of tailings; at Eldorado’s mines, large 
amounts of this material was used as backfill underground, but much was dumped at the surface. 
During the early period of their operation, Beaverlodge area mines were permitted to use small 
local lakes as tailings impoundments, although these frequently overflowed and carried tailings 
(along with unknown amounts of heavy metals, radioactive material, and process chemicals) into 
Beaverlodge Lake and (at the Gunnar operation) Lake Athabasca (Canada 1982; IEC Beak 
Consultants et. al. 1986). Before the 1970s, however, few pollution control regulations were 
placed on mines generally or on uranium operations specifically (Sims 1981, 88-89; Stenson 
2006). Provincial officials vacillated on the issue of controlling water pollution; they monitored 
tailings impoundments and urged improvements on the companies, but appeared resigned to 
allowing the ‘sacrifice’ of local lakes for waste disposal (Globe and Mail 1964; MacDonald 
1951; Shannon 1954; Sheridan 1960). Uranium production posed an additional challenge in that 
it generated significant health and environmental threats from radiological contamination (Sims 
1981; Mogren 2002; Amundsen 2002; Kuletz 1998). 
 Northern mines were also nodal points for larger flows of energy and materials that could 
have profound impacts on distant landscapes and environments. Piper, for instance, traces the 
generation (via a hydroelectric dam) and mobilization (of diesel from Alberta) of energy supplies 
to feed the tremendous demands of the mine (2009, 248-250). Hydroelectric power for 
Eldorado’s Beaverlodge operations was provided by the lease and expansion of the Wellington 
Lake dam, some 30 kilometres from Uranium City, originally built by Consolidated Mining and 
Smelting for its nearby Box gold mine (which closed in 1942). Flows of labour and materials 
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necessitated rapid planning and construction of transportation facilities at a series of sites across 
the region. These included a company airstrip at the Eldorado mill site on Beaverlodge Lake; a 
Saskatchewan Government Airways float plane base on Martin Lake near the site of Uranium 
City; and a port established by the Northern Transportation Company (NTCL, a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Eldorado) at Bushell on Black Bay on Lake Athabasca, which linked the region to 
the extensive NTCL water transportation network that spanned much of the Mackenzie Basin 
(Bothwell 1984, Chapter 10). 
 Another example of the distant environmental effects tied to the Uranium City mines was 
their voracious appetite for wood. Mine and townsite construction created a tremendous demand 
for lumber for ties, shaft timbers, and general construction. The mixed jackpine forests of the 
rugged Tazin Lake uplands of the Beaverlodge District provided a poor timber supply, so 
Eldorado turned to the old-growth white spruce forests of the Peace-Athabasca Delta region at 
the Alberta end of Lake Athabasca for its lumber needs. Although these forests were located 
within Wood Buffalo National Park, and therefore nominally protected from logging, federal 
Northern Administration and Lands officials responded enthusiastically for timber permit 
requests by EMR, even carrying out surveys to determine the amount of merchantable timber 
available. As parks historian Barry Potyondi notes, federal administrators regarded the supply of 
the Uranium City mines as only the beginning of park forest exploitation in service of anticipated 
northern industrial developments, especially mines and railways (Potyondi 1981, 139-140). In 
1951, a small sawmill operated by a contractor was erected at Peace River, employing mostly 
Native labour from the Fort Chipewyan area (Potyondi 1981; McCormack 1984). By 1956, 
Eldorado had harvested well over 18 million board-feet (fbm) of sawn lumber and a further 
400,000 linear feet of round timber from Timber Berth 253. In 1958, the company used its high-
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level contacts in the federal Northern Affairs department to broker a no-bid contract for access to 
a further 30 million fbm of timber, although its actual harvest was curtailed by the burning down 
of its sawmill (for the second time) and reduced lumber demands by the early 1960s (Robertson 
1958). 
Although located far from the mines themselves, mining-induced lumber operations had 
profound impacts on the local environment in Wood Buffalo National Park. Thousands of 
hectares of old-growth white spruce were clear-cut, with few efforts at artificial regeneration. 
Poor forest practices resulted in the loss of snags, lack of watercourse buffers, excessive debris in 
streams, and loss of vertical and horizontal structure, all with detrimental effects on wildlife 
(Timoney 1996a, 1996b). On Timber Berth 253, Eldorado and its contractor came under fire 
from federal Northern Affairs officials for logging outside the berth, wasteful milling and 
logging practices, and bulldozing sawdust and wood waste directly onto the iced-over Peace 
River, to be carried away at spring break-up (LeCapelin 1956). Further, park officials’ 
predictions of further development were correct: several other private operators received cutting 
rights and erected sawmills in the region, supplying both southern markets and mines in the 
Uranium City district (Potyondi 1981, Appendix A). Various private concerns subsequently 
promoted railways, mineral prospecting, and a townsite within the park, proposals welcomed by 
Northern Affairs officials (Potyondi 1981, 161). Though only a few of these activities ever 
materialized, beyond lumbering and accommodations for mill workers at Sweetgrass Landing, 
the development impetus frequently created conflict with official mandates to park landscapes. 
Uranium mining in the Athabasca district spurred the industrial colonization of northern 
resources, both at primary extraction sites and beyond, through the expansion of transportation 
links and ancillary resource and energy demands. In this sense, uranium development mirrored 
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the ‘cyclonic’ character of nineteenth-century gold rushes as described by Innis, in its rapid 
penetration and spatial reorganization of hinterland regions by capital, technology, and labour. 
This process generated profound environmental consequences, but few paused to consider the 
long-term (and far-flung) ecological impacts, unencumbered as the industry was by effective 
conservation or environmental protection regulations (Sims 1981). A damning report by 
provincial biologist F.M Atton chronicled the pollution resulting from poorly planned and 
shoddily built tailings impoundments, and noted there was no reporting of the characteristics of 
tailings, their volume, or where they were deposited (Atton 1958). But most provincial 
authorities in Saskatchewan were mainly concerned with ensuring the capture of resource rents 
and managing the administrative challenges of the mining boom. Mining’s environmental 
consequences and legacies, however, already evident during the early phases of mining, often 
long outlived the initial developments themselves. Although the Eldorado Beaverlodge mine was 
decommissioned upon closure in 1982, dozens of other mines, as well as the Gunnar and Lorado 
mill sites, were simply abandoned without remediation (Canada 1982). The abandoned sites and 
millions of tons of tailings produced in the Beaverlodge District, although not considered acutely 
toxic to humans or the surrounding biota, are currently the subject of a $47.9 million joint 
federal-provincial remediation effort launched in 2007 (Saskatchewan Research Council 2009). 
This project also aims to stabilize or eliminate many of the physical hazards, such as mine shafts 
and abandoned buildings, that still dot the landscape long after the end of mining. 
 
Cyclonic communities 
As in the United States, the remote locations of uranium mines in Cold War Canada 
fostered the creation of ‘yellowcake towns,’ settlements devoted exclusively (or nearly so) to the 
18 
 
production of uranium. As Michael Amundsen notes, the towns dotting the uranium fields of the 
American west were often, but not always company-controlled. Whether open towns or company 
towns, these settlements remained ‘Creatures of Uncle Sam,’ tied to the peculiar market demands 
and regulatory structures of the U.S. government’s national security interests (Amundsen 2002, 
Chapter 7). The Canadian post-war yellowcake towns of Uranium City and Elliot Lake, Ontario, 
were similarly enmeshed in uranium’s market and regulatory nexus, but they differed from their 
American contemporaries in that the towns themselves were also shaped by substantial 
government involvement in planning, settlement, and administration. For CCF politicians and 
bureaucrats in Saskatchewan, planning at Uranium City aimed to ensure that the benefits of 
industry accrued to the province and its residents, and that resource extraction around Lake 
Athabasca demonstrate the principles of rational, orderly development. 
In town planning, at least, the CCF was in tune with the sentiments of postwar Canada. 
As hinterland natural resource activities boomed, both governments and industry sought to create 
independent communities that would foster stable workforces by providing the social, cultural, 
and economic amenities demanded by modern families. The movement towards 
comprehensively planned towns was ‘designed largely to remove companies from town control, 
to stimulate popular local government organization, and thus the provision of urban services, and 
to foster an atmosphere of permanence’ (Porteous 1970, 318). Although resource-town planning 
dates to early in the twentieth century, communities on the staples frontier often exhibited 
chaotic development, strict company control, and social and economic volatility (Lucas 1971; 
Stelter and Artibise 1978; Bowles 1992). Efforts to counter these problems culminated in the 
nearly fifty comprehensive town planning exercises undertaken between 1945 and 1958 for 
resource communities across the country, most notably Kitimat, British Columbia, Schefferville, 
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Quebec, and Elliot Lake (Hodge 2001, 194; Robinson 1962). Planners struggled to resolve the 
tension between economic instability of resource towns and their projected role as catalysts for 
regional development. In Saskatchewan, planning represented an attempt by the state to 
moderate the cyclonic effects of the staples economy, particularly in its early phases. The 
contradictions and failures that beset this effort may be attributed to uranium’s peculiar market 
and institutional arrangements, as well as the at-times contradictory goals and actions of the 
federal and provincial government agencies involved. 
In many ways, a yellowcake town seemed to provide the ideal situation for enacting the 
stabilizing goals of town planning in northern Saskatchewan. All aspects of uranium 
development were strictly regulated by government agencies; the principal company operating in 
the region, Eldorado Mining and Refining, was itself a federal Crown corporation. Eldorado 
officials embraced the idea of a planned town, in part to avoid the burdens of administrating a 
company town for its employees. The company had successfully operated the mine community 
at Port Radium since the 1930s, but its officials hoped that the costs of housing miners in the 
Athabasca district could be shared amongst the several mining companies active in the region 
(Bothwell 1984, Chapter 8). In 1949, Eldorado moved its base of operations from Fish Hook Bay 
on Lake Athabasca to nearby Beaverlodge Lake, and by 1951 had entered negotiations with the 
province over the regulations and procedures for establishing a mining community. Eldorado 
directly linked its strategies of ore extraction and processing to the problem of employee 
settlement and retention. Discussing the need for adequate and attractive housing, company 
President William J. Bennett commented that, ‘We have a fair tonnage that will stand almost any 
kind of operation. We have indication of good sized tonnages of low grade material and I think it 
is important we be efficient enough to mine this marginal ore. We cannot do it unless we can 
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develop a first class staff and labour force’(Bennett 1951b). While the company remained leery 
of committing to a central townsite unless other mines were likely to develop, Bennett noted that, 
‘it is in our interest that [the town] be as close to the property as possible without actually being 
on our doorstep,’ and the company actively lobbied the province over the location of the new 
town (Bennett 1951c). 
Seeking models for the settlement, provincial officials studied similar planned 
communities with an eye to establishing key principles for townsite regulation. An initial 1949 
report outlined several of these principles, including: the lease of land to mines rather than 
outright sale; the location of a townsite away from the mine site; the avoidance of water pollution 
and damage to fish; the survey of large lots (50’ frontage) to enable gardening to supplement 
imported produce; and finally, the discouragement of squatting in a ‘shanty town’ on the 
outskirts of the community (Bereskin 1949). After a review of planned settlements at Deep River 
and Ajax, Ontario, Arvida, Quebec, Yellowknife, Northwest Territories, and Snow Lake, 
Manitoba, Saskatchewan Department of Natural Resources officials adopted the Snow Lake 
Townsite Agreement as the basis for negotiations with Eldorado (and other mining companies) 
for the financing of the town’s surveys, clearance, infrastructure and administration 
(Saskatchewan, Department of Natural Resources, 1951b). The government and the company 
both regarded quality housing as important to retaining competent staff, yet noted that miners 
tended to be reluctant to assume the burden of housing finance due to the volatile nature of the 
industry. Thus assistance was sought from the federal Central Mortgage and Housing 
Corporation (CMHC) for orderly housing development through home financing schemes and 
planning reviews (Crossley 1951).  
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Both the physical landscapes of the new town and their representation to southerners 
exemplified the government’s vision for the future of the region. Like many other ‘instant’ 
resource communities, the town plan exhibited the characteristics of a ‘suburb in the wilderness’ 
(Bowles 1992; McCann 1978). The residential site was separated from the Eldorado mine-mill 
complex by about nine kilometers, in keeping with the trend towards the separation of homes and 
industries (Saskatchewan, Department of Natural Resources 1951a). Wide, curvilinear streets 
and boulevards, cul-de-sacs, and ample lot sizes reflected the influence of Garden City and ‘new 
town’ ideas, which sought to mitigate the social and environmental effects of industrialism 
through ample amenities and salubrious physical spaces (White 2004). As a notice issued by the 
Deputy Minister of Natural Resources, C.A.L. Hogg, to workers landscaping the site in 1951 
noted, ‘It is common history in many Canadian mining regions for mineral development to result 
in dispoiled [sic] countryside and shabby shack towns. We are planning to avoid such unsightly 
developments here. ... We have an opportunity to foster the planning and building of a tidy and 
model town which will be a fine place to live in and visit, with good homes, treed streets and 
clean right of ways’ (Hogg 1951b). By creating a suburban landscape in place of the traditional 
mining boomtown, with its male-dominated company bunkhouses, this design also sought to 
attract a more stable workforce by appealing to postwar Canadian values of home and 
automobile ownership, family-centred life, and patterns of domestic consumption (Stelter and 
Artibise 1978, 13-14; Halseth and Sullivan 2002, 23; Harris, R. 2004). 
The government cemented the apparent modernity of the new town with its selection of a 
name: Uranium City (Hogg 1951a).ii With its exotic associations with the frontier north and its 
links to the ultra-modern atomic age, the ‘city’ became something of a media sensation in the 
early 1950s. Reporters from Life, the New York Times, and southern Canadian media visited, 
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invariably recounting the romantic ‘uranium rush’ days and contrasting them with the emerging 
modern community in the wilderness (Saskatoon Star-Phoenix 1953a, 1953b; Globe and Mail 
1954; Anderson 1955; Regina Leader-Post 1957). Capturing these images of frontier modernity, 
a Regina Leader-Post reporter described Uranium City as ‘a community born in an atomic test 
tube, being raised by men from many nations, and living forever in hope’ (Moon 1953, 3). 
Provincial Department of Natural Resource officials, writing in The Canadian Geographer, 
contended that, through community and resource planning, ‘an almost deserted land is becoming 
a thriving industrial area’ (McCutcheon and Young 1954, 62). True to script, United Nations 
Food and Agriculture Organization bureaucrat Richie Calder likened arriving in Uranium City in 
the mid-1950s to ‘forsaking the “Old” North for the “New” North and stepping out of the 
romantic past into the scientific future, into the Atomic Age’ (Calder 1957, 66). Calder pointedly 
noted the almost banal orderliness of the town, contrasting it with the hardscrabble boomtowns 
of past mining rushes.  
In spite of these optimistic assessments, even as the province began the surveying and 
laying out the town the region’s development had begun to spiral out of control. The renewed 
staking rush following the Eldorado mill announcement in 1951 had, by early the following year, 
overwhelmed the government’s limited planning and management capabilities. Over the winter 
of 1951-52, enterprising cheechakos hauled buildings across the ice of Lake Athabasca from the 
nearby abandoned gold mining town of Goldfields, parking them along the rough cut of Uranium 
Road at the new townsite (Phillips 1952; McIntyre 1993). Shacks and tent-buildings sprang up; 
one mining company commenced a drilling operation on a claim in the middle of the surveyed 
but uncleared site. Although the physical development of the town had only just begun, by spring 
the government was forced to begin the disposition of town lots for commercial and residential 
23 
 
developments in order, according to one Saskatchewan official, ‘to avoid complete chaos’ 
(Shannon 1952). Prospectors and businesses also began to locate at Bushell, the transportation 
port established nearby on Lake Athabasca, much to the chagrin of both the government and 
Eldorado. Despite the government’s best intentions, Uranium City quickly emerged as a town of 
windswept, grubby streets lined with poorly built shacks: ‘A few substantial houses have been 
erected or brought in from elsewhere, but as in the business district, most people seem to prefer 
to build as cheaply as possible’ (Saskatchewan, Department of Natural Resources 1954, 1952a) 
Local residents alternately criticized the province and Eldorado for the poor roads and slow pace 
of development (Brown 1953; The Uranium Times 1954). 
These problems reflected, in part, the province’s dispute with Eldorado over the financing 
of townsite preparation. As the company’s official historian, Robert Bothwell notes, much of the 
blame for the dispute falls to the province (Bothwell 1984, 295-302). Although committed to 
avoiding the creation of a ‘company town,’ the province nevertheless insisted on substantial 
contributions from Eldorado towards infrastructure and construction at Uranium City. The 
company supported the creation of a central townsite, but balked at assuming the nearly 
$700,000 cost estimated for surveys, road clearance, infrastructure, and a hospital that would 
benefit not only its employees but also competitors (Bennett 1952; Brockelbank 1953). As the 
dispute dragged on into 1953, settlement planning at Uranium City struggled to keep up with the 
influx of workers and prospectors. In that year, the province created a new administrative unit, 
the Local Development Area, which allowed the government to regulate regional development 
and land disposition while providing for joint government-industry financing of municipal and 
regional services until the establishment of a regular municipality. The townsite at Uranium City 
began to take shape, more or less as planned (Figure 2), and the province forged ahead with 
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further rounds of municipal planning studies in 1955 and 1956. The first, by an advisory 
committee to the Beaverlodge Local Development Area, forecast further profitable uranium 
development, predicting that Uranium City could become the largest city in Canada north of 55o 
‘and at the centre of the most intensively developed industrial area in northern Canada’ 
(Saskatchewan, Department of Natural Resources 1955). A comprehensive town planning report 
published a year later acknowledged some of the early problems, but offered a similarly positive 
outlook. The authors made detailed recommendations for education, streets, infrastructure, 
recreation, social administration, industry and transportation, commercial establishments, and 
public administration (Izumi and Arnott 1956). [INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Yet government regulations and the creation of a central townsite did not prevent the 
establishment of dispersed settlements at various mine sites, including Beaverlodge. At a 
separate residential area near its mine-mill complex, Eldorado constructed bunkhouses for single 
men as well as special housing for technical and managerial staff, which required ‘the very best 
living conditions’ (Gilchrist 1953; Crossley 1950) (Figure 3). For most of the 1950s, nearly 80 
per cent of Eldorado’s employees lived at ‘Eldorado townsite’ (Parsons and Barsi 2001), 
reflecting the high annual labour turnover characteristic of remote mining enterprises. The 
company only launched its housing construction and finance scheme in mid-1954, offering no-
interest, no down-payment loans to employees wishing to locate at Uranium City. Some smaller 
mines in the region, such as Rix-Athabasca, also located employees at bunkhouses near mine 
sites. At the Gunnar Mine, located 20 miles to the south and unconnected by a year-round road, 
the province was forced to relent and allow for a company townsite, including a school and 
community centre. Still, in allowing the Gunnar development, the province sought to protect 
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Uranium City’s status as the regional hub for government and retail services, and workers 
(Davidson 1955; Brown 1955). 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Nor did planning prevent fringe settlements and social problems from emerging at 
Uranium City and nearby Bushell. Squatting and tent-camping by prospectors and ‘vagrants’ was 
difficult to contain, given the difficult nature of northern travel. The province issued anti-
squatting regulations aimed at confining development to the townsite itself, where housing and 
people could be regulated, designating a ‘peripheral reserved area’ of 1.5 miles around the 
surveyed areas of Bushell and Uranium City, and ¼ mile on either side of Uranium Road, within 
which any structures had to receive government approval.iii Of particular concern were the large 
numbers of Cree, Dene and Métis people attracted to the new settlement by the prospects of 
seasonal work. Aboriginal people found employment as guides, camp workers, and brush cutters 
during the busy prospecting season, and tended to occupy summer camps at the fringes of the 
town. In 1953, for instance, so many were attracted to the Uranium City region from Fort 
Chipewyan in Alberta that Indian Agent Jack Stewart travelled to Saskatchewan to pay treaty to 
Fort Chipewyan Indians (McCormack 1984, 411). 
The province had anticipated the presence of Aboriginal migrants as early as 1951 
(Young 1951),iv but appeared unsure how to deal with them, in part because the CCF’s northern 
development plans coincided with the government’s ambition to improve conditions for northern 
Aboriginal people. In many northern communities, the declining fur trade economy and 
increased competition from non-Native trappers in the 1930s had strained the already marginal 
economies of many Native and Métis groups (Quiring 2004, Heber 2005; Bone et. al. 1973). 
Although the region experienced sporadic commercial activities before the 1950s, such as 
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commercial fishing on Lake Athabasca and the mine at Goldfields, Aboriginal people remained 
largely sidelined in such ventures. As part of its ‘New North’ initiative, CCF policies sought the 
assimilation of Aboriginal communities into the new industrial order, while moderating the 
unsettling social and cultural effects of rapid modernization. These interventionist policies 
included inducements to nucleated settlement, improved health and welfare services, and training 
in industrial labour skills and mores. Premier Douglas spoke of ‘walking in the moccasins’ of 
Native and Métis people, but as Laurie Barron notes, ‘the CCF perceived the North as a remote 
hinterland in need of effective colonization; hence, the solutions it imposed there were little more 
than reflections of the values and agenda of southern society’ (Barron 1997, 144; Dobbin 1985). 
The substantial presence of Aboriginal ‘squatters’ at Uranium City seemed to defy the 
goals of an orderly, modern community, but in fact epitomized their continued marginalization. 
On the one hand, provincial officials hoped that ‘if a commercial and industrial town develops, 
this indigenous group will be absorbed, and in part at least, assimilated, and into a better 
environment than would otherwise be the case’(Saskatchewan, Department of Natural 
Resources, No date a). Yet the government appeared reluctant to absorb Aboriginal settlers 
attracted to the community, despite nominally allowing ‘equal access’ to leaseholding in the 
town. While recognizing the employment the town offered Métis people, provincial officials in 
1952 rejected the creation of ‘special reserves,’ suggesting that ‘we should simply form a policy 
of requiring them to move from areas where they would be particularly in the way, but allow 
them to camp in some other areas’ (Saskatchewan, Department of Natural Resources 1952a). As 
the problem of peripheral settlements continued to grow, a 1954 report proposed either helping 
Aboriginal families to purchase lots in town, or banishing the summer camps further from the 
town (Saskatchewan, Department of Natural Resources 1954). Schoolteacher Ben McIntyre 
27 
 
recalled that a few families, such as the Mercredis, did move into the town (McIntyre 1993, 
Chapter 16). But by the mid-1950s, an estimated 150 Treaty Indians and 200-300 Métis lived in 
the vicinity of the town, most occupying fringe camps such as ‘SGA Hill,’ a site near the town’s 
float plane base that became notorious for declining public health and sanitary conditions as the 
camp took on an air of permanence (Brown 1954; McIntyre 1993).v The major community 
planning study of Uranium City and district in 1956 again highlighted this problem, but its 
proposed solutions reinforced the social segregation of the community: it suggested the rigorous 
enforcement of the development boundary around the town, or the establishment of a permanent 
‘Indian Community’ nearby (Izumi and Arnott 1956, 22). Such discrimination extended to other 
aspects of community life. For instance, Eldorado operated a school at the Beaverlodge townsite 
for its professional employees, in part because of the reluctance of these employees to send their 
children to school with Native and Métis children (Brown 1953).vi Similar complaints arose at 
Uranium City, although the school there remained integrated. 
The cyclonic nature of mineral development, with its immense and immediate 
requirements for capital and skilled labour, also undermined government efforts to promote 
Aboriginal participation in the new industrial economy. As Barron (1997, 155) notes, ‘The 
development of sub-surface resources, particularly uranium, had the power to outstrip all other 
forms of wealth in the North, but it was almost exclusively a white man’s domain.’ In 1949, the 
provincial government created a special Native Prospectors’ Assistance Plan, run by Métis 
activist and Department of Natural Resources employee Malcolm Norris, that included training 
in mineral identification, the use of Geiger counters, and mining regulations. This modest 
program succeeded in training a few prospectors, but most Aboriginal workers remained 
confined to seasonal jobs such as brush-cutting, road clearance, packing, and hunting for non-
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Aboriginal prospectors (Richards 1986, 160-162). Lacking the requisite education and training, 
Native and Métis people were virtually excluded from underground work. In 1962, Eldorado 
counted only 8 Treaty Indians or Métis on a payroll of 564 (Buckley et. al. 1963, 19). Eldorado 
did employ Aboriginal people at its mill site on a casual basis for cleanup and other duties, 
referring to them as ‘temporary Indian labour’ (Eldorado Mining and Refining 1965; Dufort 
1967).  
While partly attributable to a lack of education, skills, or inclination, the selective 
inclusion of Aboriginal labour in the mining sector also reflected widespread assumptions about 
‘Native character.’ One 1951 provincial report on northern conditions described ‘the Native’ as 
‘confused, degraded, sometimes bitter and dependent like a child in a man’s world. One wonders 
seriously at times if he can ever pick himself up by his own boot straps’ (Davidson 1951). The 
government regarded Aboriginal  peoples’ ‘pre-industrial way of life’ as suiting them for such 
occupations as prospecting, but as undermining their ability to adapt to the time-discipline of 
shift work at mines and in other industries (Quiring 2004, 177). Nor were mining companies any 
more active in addressing the problem. Eldorado only launched a Native employment program 
after the problem of benefits to northerners and Aboriginal  people became a focus of the Cluff 
Lake Board of Inquiry hearings into uranium industry expansion in the mid-1970s (Canada 1992; 
Goulet 1997; Parsons and Barsi 2001). In contrast to its mining operations, Eldorado’s lumber 
contractors at Wood Buffalo National Park employed considerable numbers of Aboriginal  
workers from the Fort Chipewyan area during the winter logging seasons. But as Patricia 
McCormack notes, these employments induced Native people away from traditional economic 
activities and towards wage labour, creating a precarious new dependency on external forces of 
commodity markets and labour demands (McCormack 1984, 461-467). 
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These problems mirrored the larger contradictions of southern Canadian policies towards 
northern development and Aboriginal  people in this period. As noted, the Douglas CCF 
government deplored the economic hardship and social dislocation suffered by Aboriginal  
communities, and hoped to remedy these problems in part through industrial development. In 
practice, however, government policies reinforced the emergent racial geography of the 
provincial north (Quiring 2004, 58-63, chapter 8). Aboriginal people, although encouraged to 
settle in nucleated communities, were effectively excluded from living in new industrial 
settlements such as Uranium City and Creighton, which came to resemble colonies of southern 
society implanted into the north (Barron 1997, Chapter 5). In a stinging 1961 report for the 
provincial Centre for Community Studies, British anthropologist P.M. Worsely highlighted the 
residential segregation of northern Saskatchewan, where the extraction of mineral riches 
provided little benefit to northern residents. Worsley compared the region’s social and economic 
inequities to the ‘tropical slums’ of the colonial South Pacific and suggested that, in complex 
ways, the unequal ethnic geography of the north was tied to the dependence of the region on a 
staple economy. He portrayed the north as a dependent region in which a colonial elite of whites 
oversaw the extraction and export of raw materials, with little long-term benefit or opportunity 
for the indigenous population (Worsley et. al. 1961, Chap. 1). Subsequent reports on Northern 
Saskatchewan underscored the barriers of class and ethnicity that posed severe limits on class 
mobility and adjustment to new economic opportunities (Buckley et. al. 1963; Bone et. al. 1973).  
As a force for northern colonization, then, cyclonic development could have especially 
disruptive effects for indigenous cultures and economies. Rapid, disruptive industrial advances 
affected Native communities across Canada’s north: as a 1963 federal Indian Affairs Branch 
report concluded, ‘while progress has been achieved in some areas… much remains to be done 
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before Indians may be said to share satisfactorily in the life of the general community. This is 
most serious in areas where hunting and trapping are being disrupted by mining and other 
developments which do not provide alternate means of livelihood’ (Canada 1963, 5; Lotz 1962). 
Historic uranium development in Aboriginal  territories has been linked with a wide variety of 
negative social and environmental consequences, including elevated addiction rates, out-
migration, negative external cultural influences, access roads disrupting hunting and trapping 
areas, and the erosion of traditional knowledge and practices amongst the young (Heber 2005, 
252-253). In spite of hopeful training initiatives, Aboriginal  people initially remained at the 
physical and occupational margins of this new industrial economy—as they did elsewhere in 
Canada during this period. Although combined with contact-traditional subsistence and trapping 
activities, wage labour served to orient Aboriginal  people towards new settlements, yet they 
tended to remain ‘semi-settled surplus labour living off the land [that] served the needs of 
industrial capital’ (Tough 1996, 284; Morantz 2002, 200). Similarly, the simultaneous inclusion 
and exclusion of Aboriginal people at Uranium City illustrates the complexity of Aboriginal 
engagement with northern industrial settlement and economies, but also its fundamental 
inequality.  
 
Reaping the whirlwind 
‘Anyone who has seen, as I have, buildings being hauled miles to be used in a 
new town—buildings from the town of Goldfields on Lake Athabasca, founded in 
the thirties but abandoned and deserted in the early fifties—cannot forget the 
sensitivity to external factors that will govern the development of the Northwest, 
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just as long as mineral exploration has to be the basis of the economy.’ (Buck and 
Henderson 1962, 115) 
Segregated by race and (partly) by class, caught between the priorities of government and 
industry, and struggling to live up to the heady promises of its promoters and planners, Uranium 
City, by the end of the 1950s, merely awaited the next chapter of its instant-town story: the 
turning of the cyclonic gyre that signaled the coming decline. The bust came with a certain 
inevitability, but as with the rest of the early history of the Beaverlodge area, the events bore the 
mark of the peculiar market forces and regulatory arrangements surrounding uranium, its 
founding staple. The USAEC uranium procurement program, which formed the sole market for 
this ‘strategic mineral,’ had proven almost too successful in stimulating exploration and 
development in both Canada and the United States. By the 1950s, in addition to northern 
Saskatchewan, booming uranium districts had emerged in Northern Ontario and the 
Southwestern United States (Gray 1982). However, by 1958, the failure to develop peaceful 
nuclear technologies, combined with the leveling off of the U.S. military stockpiling program 
and new limits on nuclear testing, resulted in a slackening of demand for uranium, and the 
USAEC moved to curtail domestic production and end imports after 1962 (Amundsen 2002). 
The collapse of the major market for uranium sent Eldorado and federal trade officials 
scrambling to negotiate contract terms in order to cushion the blow to the industry and the 
communities that had grown up around it. Under a ‘stretch-out’ program, deliveries of existing 
orders for yellowcake were extended for three years (to 1965), and the government permitted 
companies to sell their production contracts, which allowed smaller companies to sell out and 
ensured that some producers would survive the initial shock (Bothwell 1984, 422-427). The 
longer-term goal was to maintain a viable uranium industry until the hoped-for arrival of a 
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civilian atomic energy program. The federal government resisted pressure from private uranium 
companies, mainly based in the Elliot Lake region, to restrict Eldorado’s abilities to bid on the 
remaining uranium contracts, noting that the federal company would be left without contracts 
beyond 1962 and that ‘this, in turn, would leave Uranium City derelict.’ Notably, in federal 
Cabinet discussions, ‘special efforts’ to keep the Beaverlodge area afloat were justified by the 
massive public expenditures for establishing the town (Canada, Privy Council Office 1959, 7). 
Indeed, the debates over the future of Uranium City reflected the strong sense on all sides 
of the distinctive role of the state in uranium developments. Reflecting on the political 
ramifications of the stretch-out policy, Cabinet documents noted that, ‘The government was 
inescapably involved in the future of the uranium industry, and would be blamed, rightly or 
wrongly, for any misfortunes suffered by any and all producers’ (Canada, Privy Council Office 
1959, 8). Uranium City workers and residents, as well as the Saskatchewan government, were 
equally attuned to this circumstance. Appealing to the province for assistance for displaced 
workers, the Uranium City local of the International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter workers 
suggested the nationalization of the industry ‘as a national asset to be owned and operated in the 
interests of Canada’s economy and prosperity’ (International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter 
Workers, Western District, 1960). An ad-hoc citizens’ committee from Uranium City contended 
that governments bore a special responsibility to help the community through the crisis:  
The further fact that the problems arise, not from activities normally engaged in 
by the citizens, but within the framework of a government induced and sponsored 
industry, and that it was in turn a government decision which has created the 
suddenly altered circumstances of the people involved ... places the government in 
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the position of definite responsibility to assist in every way possible. (Uranium 
City Citizens’ Committee 1960). 
These appeals clearly influenced a Saskatchewan government brief prepared for a provincial 
delegation to federal officials in 1960 (Globe and Mail 1960). In it, Premier Douglas argued, 
‘The uranium industry was established because of a national emergency. People, including not 
only prospectors, developers, promoters and financiers but also miners and other workers were 
encouraged to run the risk of attaching themselves to this industry to meet that emergency’ 
(Douglas 1960). While applauding the stretch-out program, the brief suggested compensation for 
investment losses, financial assistance for relocation, and measures for alleviating the financial 
and tax burden on remaining residents. 
 In spite of the negotiation of new contracts with Britain and the announcement of 
Canadian government stockpiling, the impending end of USAEC deliveries resulted in the severe 
contraction of the Canadian industry. After 1962, only four companies survived: two each at 
Elliot Lake and Beaverlodge (where Eldorado and Gunnar Mines continued). By 1965, several 
smaller mines in Saskatchewan, as well as the Lorado mill and the Gunnar mine-mill complex, 
had all closed, leaving only Eldorado standing. In this initial decline at Uranium City, the 
cyclonic metaphor finds only partial purchase: the result of these market shifts, however sudden, 
was less a total collapse than a kind of suspended animation (Scott 1959). The census population 
of Uranium City and District fell to 2,147 in 1966 from a high of 3,636 in 1956 (although 
estimated population levels at the height of the boom ran to 5,500) (Statistics Canada 1971, 2-
102). By 1965, Eldorado’s payroll had shrunk by over 40 per cent from its high of 935 in 1958, 
but mine production and ore development continued at a steady if reduced rate in anticipation of 
future requirements. Although the company continued to experience very high annual labour 
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turnover, annual reports noted that increasing numbers of employees were living in company-
financed housing at Uranium City, reflecting the growing numbers of married personnel 
(Eldorado Mining and Refining 1965). Newspaper reports catalogued the business failures and 
incipient dereliction of parts of the town in the wake of the bust and the departure of half the 
town’s residents. Still, many remained confident of a recovery once market prospects for 
uranium—driven by the eternal promise of atomic energy—improved (Gray 1959, 1960; 
Denhoff 1961; Whelly 1961; Sackmann 1964). 
 The uranium market did recover, albeit haltingly, in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
(Cresswell 1972). By the late 1970s uranium production in Saskatchewan once again matched 
the highs reached in the late 1950s, jolted into recovery by new ore discoveries and improved 
international markets due to the energy crisis and the lifting of the U.S. ban on uranium imports. 
At Uranium City, however, rejuvenation was short-lived. Citing declining ore grades, rising 
production costs, and sagging world prices, in December 1981, with devastating suddenness 
Eldorado announced the permanent closure of its Beaverlodge operations, throwing 850 
employees out of work (Eldorado Nuclear Limited 1981; McIntyre (1993), chapter 55). Although 
workers received severance and relocation packages, the virtual collapse of the community 
provoked bitterness in local residents (Globe and Mail 1982). As with its birth, Uranium City’s 
swift death stoked the interest of the southern media, which has travelled north from time to time 
since then to chronicle the gradual abandonment of the community (whose population now 
numbers in the dozens) (Cleroux 1981, 1982; Bunner 1985; Laird 2002). Replaced by fly-in, fly-
out mining operations and company bunkhouses, Uranium City has appeared to many to be 
Canada’s ‘last boom town,’ a relic of an earlier era of short-lived optimism and misguided faith 




Of cyclones and mines 
 As Gavin Bridge (2004, 241) argues, ‘With its capacity for generating both tremendous 
wealth and intense environmental transformation, mining is a potent metaphor for the energies 
and contradictions of development.’ Shifts in the ‘mining imaginary’—society’s images of 
mining as either a positive or destructive force—reflect broader cultural and economic 
expectations and anxieties that are projected onto the industry. Harold Innis himself, writing in 
the 1930s, touted mining as the forerunner ‘a highly-integrated advanced type of industrial 
community’ (Innis 1936, 403). As Matthew Evenden points out, Innis’s northern vision regarded 
‘mineral development [as] one of the most important staple industries of the twentieth century. In 
its wake, the Canadian economy would reorient itself along a northern axis; railway links to 
Hudson Bay would rebalance the transportation economy of the nation’ (Evenden 1999, 178; 
Innis 1930). Yet from the contemporary perspective of concerns over uneven geographical 
development, resource dependency, environmental impacts, and social justice, the place of 
mining in the Canadian political economy seems problematic at best (McAllister 2007; Keeling 
and Sandlos 2009). Recent gyrations of international commodities markets, which have led to 
record production values and exploration and development investments (Mining Association of 
Canada 2008), then subsequently to layoffs and mine closures, seem to underscore the continued 
fragility of the mining economy. 
 Historical mineral development has produced distinctive landscapes in Canada’s 
hinterland regions, marked by dramatic, often destructive changes to environment and human 
settlements only partly accounted for in sociological or economic analyses. Following Barnes 
and Innis, I suggest that the landscapes of Uranium City resulted from a process of dis-ordering 
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and re-ordering of society, space, and nature that may be usefully conceptualized through the 
metaphor of cyclonics. The historical geography of Uranium City captures cyclonic 
development’s rapidity and intensity, and also the destructiveness of the shifting winds of 
economic fortune. The cyclone model may also be used to link these economic and social 
dynamics to both the development discourses and material processes involved in the production 
of landscape, factors rarely ‘thought together’ in examinations of staples-dependent regions. 
 By grafting environmental perspectives onto the cyclone model, we can better understand 
the ecological consequences engendered by rapid resource development. Uranium production not 
only transformed and degraded local environments, but also drew in other spaces and ecologies 
through its demands for resources, such as wood and energy. At the local scale, although the 
Eldorado mine was decommissioned and remediated upon closure in 1982, tailings piles, the 
Gunnar open pit, the Lorado mill site and dozens of other satellite mines in the Beaverlodge 
region pose physical and chemical hazards only now undergoing remediation (Saskatchewan 
Research Council 2009). Further afield, at Wood Buffalo National Park, landscapes were 
transformed through their integration with Uranium City: forests cut, lumber sawn and shipped, 
riparian ecologies disrupted, and new social and economic arrangements generated. These 
examples illustrate how, in analysing the historical geography of Canada’s resource hinterland, it 
is important to consider their material effects, not only on communities and economies, but on 
ecologies and landscapes both proximate and distant. 
 This attention to the materiality of natural resources also reinforces the necessity of 
disaggregating the notion of ‘staples’ by acknowledging the distinctive properties of and markets 
for individual commodities. As the first new post-war supplier of its strategic product, the 
Beaverlodge District occupied an important position within the nuclear geographies of Cold War 
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Canada. Uranium production, processing, and export entailed direct federal involvement through 
Eldorado, the federal Crown corporation whose activities were closely monitored by its minister, 
C.D. Howe. As part of the Eldorado empire, Uranium City shared with its predecessor, Port 
Radium, many institutional arrangements, transportation links, corporate structures, and even 
personnel (Bothwell 1984). Uranium City’s planned development and ultimate reliance on 
uranium exports found echoes in Canada’s other major uranium field, Elliot Lake. As in 
Saskatchewan, Elliot Lake’s career as a uranium producing region was marked by rapid growth, 
instability, extensive environmental contamination, and problematic relations with neighbouring 
First Nations (Gray 1982; Saarinen 1986; Mawhiney 1999; Stanley 2008). Uranium country’s 
dependence on its peculiar external market (based as it was on the initially insatiable, yet 
ultimately fickle American demand) highlight how its economic crises are better understood as 
‘whiplash declines’ (Bradbury 1984b) more akin to cyclonic development than to the ‘normal’ 
peaks and troughs of a resource cycle. Although little explored in this paper, from an 
environmental and health perspective, uranium’s distinctive properties of radioactivity have also 
posed unique challenges in characterizing, managing and, now, remediating the radiological 
hazards produced by mining, beneficiation, and waste-disposal processes. 
 The intense state involvement in all aspects of uranium development highlights the 
complex role of governments in both fostering yet attempting to mitigate instability and 
dependency in resource regions. The landscape of Uranium City, as a planned community based 
on resource extraction, embodied Canadian post-war faith in northern development and the 
political economy of the ‘staple state,’ both federal and provincial (Clark-Jones 1987). The 
state’s role is critical, Neil Smith contends, in ‘expedit[ing] and arbitrat[ing] the stable expansion 
of capitalism,’ whether through the suppression of pre-capitalist societies, ensuring access to 
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natural resources for capital, or managing labour (Smith 2008, 72). As Bradbury suggests in the 
case of Quebec, one major function of the provincial state in resource development has been ‘to 
overcome some of the results of uneven development processes and to alleviate economic 
fluctuations and crises at both regional and local levels’ (Bradbury 1982, 49). All of these 
functions of the state were evident at Uranium City. Postwar Saskatchewan’s efforts to create a 
‘new north’ through social and economic planning exemplified the desire to promote 
industrialization and redress regional economic disparities; Uranium City was at the heart of 
these initiatives. As elsewhere in northern Canada, the combination of hinterland staples 
development and an interventionist state in this period produced landscapes reflecting southern 
Canadian models of town planning. Yet, as the details of Uranium City’s laboured genesis 
illustrate, provincial efforts to promote ‘rational’ planning and to tame the unruly forces of 
resource economies were fraught with political and practical difficulties, and tended to 
reproduce, rather than mitigate, the problems of uneven development, instability, and inequality 
associated with the staples economy. 
 Finally, the attempts to promote uranium mining as the basis for the industrial 
modernization of both people and environment in Saskatchewan’s north also exemplify the deep 
connections of resource-extractive activities to neo-colonial ideologies. The planning of Uranium 
City reflected what Gavin Bridge calls the ‘modernist conceit—that preexisting socioecological 
relations can be erased and landscape reordered the better to express contemporary 
socioeconomic objectives’ (Bridge 2001, 2165-66). Provincial officials re-imagined Northern 
Saskatchewan as a blank territory for the inscription of Euro-Canadian industrial modernity, 
enabling the dispossession of indigenous people in the interests of state-capitalist development 
(Harris, C. 2004; Harvey 2003); this process echoed the ‘nuclear colonialism’ associated with 
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uranium mining and weapons testing in the U.S. Southwest (Kuletz 1998). Indeed, the CCF’s 
stated ambition to reform the ‘pre-industrial way of life’ of northern indigenous peoples 
ultimately produced and reinforced a northern economic and settlement geography separated into 
Aboriginal  and non-Aboriginal  zones. In the squatter camps of Uranium City, we can see how  
‘uneven development is social inequality blazoned into the geographical landscape’ (Smith 2008, 
206). As original inhabitants rather than sojourners in the region, northern Aboriginal people 
remained most brutally exposed to the forces of cyclonic development. Resource extraction 
rapidly overturned long-standing land use and settlement patterns in the region. While the boom 
period at Uranium City clearly attracted Aboriginal  people eager for work and wages, they 
remained occupationally and residentially segregated, and subject to the changing economic 
fortunes and priorities of external governments and markets. Facing racism and northern 
development policies that funneled profits out of the region, Aboriginal people required further 
rounds of activism and government policy-making to overcome the barriers to participation in 
mining in the northern Saskatchewan—as they did in so many other instances across the 
Canadian North in the pre-Berger era (Hipwell et. al. 2002; Notzke 1994). Further research into 
the experiences of Native and Métis people at Uranium City, possibly through oral history 
accounts, would enrich our understanding of Aboriginal encounters with cyclonic development, 
labour, and resettlement in connection with uranium mining. 
 In sum, the historical geography of Uranium City adds to our stock of cautionary tales of 
marginal, resource-dependent communities in Canada —tales with strong contemporary echoes. 
Since the turn of the century, Canadian mining exploration expenditures have hit record highs, as 
companies fanned out across the Canadian north in search of gold, diamonds, base metals, and 
uranium, often located in Aboriginal  territories. In many cases, mineral exploration has revisited 
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abandoned mine sites and regions, including around Uranium City, in search of undiscovered or 
unworked deposits (Lyons 2008). More recently, however, the steep decline in commodity 
markets beset by the worldwide economic downturn have led to new rounds of layoffs in 
mining-dependent communities such as Sudbury and Wabush in Labrador. Ultimately, the 
dereliction of much of Uranium City (and the virtual erasure of both the Eldorado and Gunnar 
townsites) stands as poignant testimony to the fragility of remote communities based around 
mine development, a fragility echoed at other shattered monuments to resource town planning 
across the Canadian north. 
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i Eldorado Gold Mines Ltd. was renamed Eldorado Mining and Refining. 
ii The name was chosen by Hogg from a list of suggestions including ‘Brockelbank’ (to honour the Saskatchewan 
Minister of Natural Resources) and ‘Uraniumfields,’ as well as nine Cree names, including ‘Kewotinok’ (‘to the 
North’) and ‘Kistapiskaw’ (‘rocky’). Hogg tersely noted in his memo: ‘We are not interested in Cree names’ (Hogg 
1951a). 




                                                                                                                                                             
iv After a consultation with two McGill University professors on the subject of town planning, Administrative 
Analyst R.G. Young noted ‘we will likely have a fairly large native population gathering outside the town’ (Young 
1951). 
v The problem persisted at least into the late 1950s: see Brown (1957) and various memos in this file.  
vi Northern Administrator C.S. Brown (1953) recounted a conversation with Eldorado mine manager W.A. Gilchrist 
regarding the construction of the school at Beaverlodge Lake. Gilchrist insisted that ‘[the company’s] experience has 
been that employees of the calibre necessary would not reconcile themselves to send their children to school along 
with metis and indian [sic] children.’ See also Kilgour (1953), which repeats the sentiment. 
